湖南省湘西土家族苗族自治州人民政府办公室



湘西土家族苗族自治州人民政府办公室文件
州政办发 [2005] 20号

关于转发《吉首地区“门前三包”责任制管理办法》和《吉首地区除“四害” 工作管理规定》的通知
　　吉首市人民政府，州政府各局委、各直属机构：
　　吉首市人民政府制定的《吉首地区“门前三包”责任制管理办法》和《吉首地区除“四害”工作管理规定》已经州人民政府同意，现转发给你们，请遵照执行。

　　二OO五年七月七日

　　吉首地区“门前三包”责任制管理办法
　　第一条 为加强吉首城区市容和环境卫生管理，创造清洁、优美、有序的城市工作和生活环境，不断提高州府吉首城市品位和市民生活质量，促进精神文明和物质文明建设，根据《城市市容和环境卫生管理条例》、《城市绿化条例》、《湖南省爱国卫生条例》等法律法规，结合吉首地区实际，特制定本办法。
　　第二条 凡吉首地区（城市规划区）范围内临街（巷）的单位（或居民户）（以下简称责任单位），均应依照本办法承担“门前三包”责任，严格按本办法管理好临街房产（场地）承租单位或个人。
　　第三条 吉首市城建城管部门和城区街道负责“门前三包”的组织实施、监督管理工作。
　　市爱卫办负责“门前三包”的指导、协调、考核工作。
　　市城工办、市公安局、市交通局、市工商局、市卫生局、市环保局、市交警大队协助搞好“门前三包”管理工作。
　　第四条 本办法所指“门前三包”内容：
　　（一）包卫生。负责责任范围内地面、墙壁、橱窗、护栏及其他市政公用设施的保洁；清除污物、污水、污痕；制止随地吐痰、乱扔乱倒废弃物、乱涂乱画、乱排乱泼污水、乱堆乱放杂物、乱贴乱挂有碍市容观瞻的物品等行为；实施生活垃圾袋（桶）装化。
　　（二）包绿化。负责保护、管理好责任范围内的树木、花草和绿化美化设施，及时清除花坛、草坪内的废弃物；对有损花草树木的行为及时制止并要求赔偿，或立即向相关职能部门报告。
　　（三）包秩序。负责劝阻、举报在责任范围内乱停、乱摆交通工具、乱摆摊担、乱搭棚亭、乱设标牌以及封建迷信活动；劝阻、举报损坏市政公用设施以及打架斗殴等损坏国家财物、扰乱社会秩序的行为。
　　门前三包”所需经费由责任单位负责。
　　第五条 “门前三包”范围：临街行道（有人行道的为人行道和绿化带外边沿为界，没有人行道的以道路中线为界）、建筑物临街立面。
　　第六条 城区各街道应组建“门前三包”领导小组，负责抓好辖区的“门前三包”工作。责任单位应在所在地街道的统一管理和指导下，切实落实管理责任和管理人员，认真搞好“门前三包”工作；凡落实“门前三包”管理人员有困难的单位可委托所在地的街道代为履行责任。
　　第七条 “门前三包”管理人员代表责任单位对其责任范围实施管理，对违反市容卫生管理规定的行为当事人，应当进行劝阻、制止、批评、教育，责令改正；对不听劝阻，拒不改正的，应及时报告相应主管部门，依照相关法律法规予以处理。对损坏市政公共设施和公共绿化的，有权要求当事人予以赔偿，赔偿经费用于恢复损坏的市政公共设施和公共绿化；同时可报告相应主管部门进行查处。
　　第八条 各街道对“门前三包”责任制落实情况进行定期检查、考核。市爱卫办每季度进行一次综合考评，对责任单位实行红黑牌制度予以奖罚。
　　第九条 责任单位不履行“门前三包”管理责任，被挂黑牌的予以通报批评、新闻曝光，并责令限期整改；逾期不整改的，应交纳“门前三包”履行责任所必须的经费。因不履行责任造成市政公共设施和公共绿化损坏的，应出资恢复和赔偿。对拒不履行“门前三包”管理责任，连续三次以上被挂黑牌的，市直单位由吉首市人民政府对责任单位主要领导和直接责任人给予批评教育或行政处分；州直以上单位由吉首市人民政府报请州人民政府对责任单位主要领导和直接责任人给予批评教育或行政处分。对阻碍执行管理、破坏干扰管理工作，违反治安管理条例的，由公安部门给予治安处罚。
　　第十条 本办法自2005年8月1日起施行。
　　吉首地区除“四害”工作管理规定
　　第一条 为预防、控制和消除老鼠、蚊子、苍蝇、蟑螂（以下简称“四害”），防止疾病传播，保障人民身体健康，根据《中华人民共和国食品卫生法》、《国务院关于加强爱国卫生工作的决定》和《湖南省爱国卫生条例》等规定，结合吉首地区实际，制定本规定。
　　第二条 吉首地区国家机关、部队、社会团体、企事业单位和其他组织（以下统称单位）以及个人，均应遵守本规定。
　　第三条 除“四害”工作应当贯彻预防为主、专群结合的方针，推行治理环境为主、药械控制为辅的综合性除“四害”措施。
　　第四条 吉首市爱国卫生运动委员会（以下简称市爱卫会）负责组织协调吉首地区除“四害”工作；市爱卫会办公室（以下简称市爱卫办）负责本规定的具体实施。
　　市爱卫办和市卫生防疫部门负责除“四害”技术指导和“四害”密度监测。
　　有关单位在各自职责范围内做好除“四害”工作。
　　街道和乡镇负责组织指导居（村）民委员会或社区，通过制定居民公约或村规民约等形式，动员本居住区住户做好除“四害”工作。
　　第五条 除“四害”所需药品、工具的工本费，由受益者承担。
　　第六条 单位负责本单位内及“门前三包”责任区内除“四害”工作；住户负责居住范围内除“四害”工作；街道负责督促辖区内单位及街巷住户除“四害”工作。
　　未划入“门前三包”责任区的其他公共环境除“四害”工作，由该公共环境管理部门负责。
　　第七条 单位应当建立健全除“四害”规章制度，其上级主管部门应当对其进行监督。
　　第八条 单位和住户应当采取清除鼠迹、堵塞鼠洞、添设防范设施等措施以及毒杀、诱捕等方法杀灭老鼠，使鼠密度等指标符合国家控制标准。
　　第九条 单位和住户必须按照下列规定清除蚊子、苍蝇孳生地，并运用化学、物理、生物等方法消灭蚊子、苍蝇及幼虫，使蚊子、苍蝇密度等指标符合国家控制标准。
　　（一）对厕所、下水道口、垃圾桶（箱）、污物容器、雨水污水蓄积地等利于蚊子、苍蝇孳生和聚集场所，采取冲洗、消毒、打扫、平整等措施，防止蚊子、苍蝇孳生、聚集，及时消灭蚊子、苍蝇及其幼虫；
　　（二）保持单位责任区域、住宅院落公共卫生和家庭卫生；
　　（三）农村集体经济组织和农户饲养禽畜，应搞好饲养场所及其周围环境卫生，清除蚊子、苍蝇孳生条件；农村菜区堆肥场由乡镇统一规划设置，垃圾处理场、粪库、粪池等由其所有者或管理、使用者做好卫生保洁工作，粪库、粪池应加盖予以密封，并在蚊子、苍蝇孳生季节定期喷洒低毒杀虫药。
　　第十条 单位和住户发现蟑螂，应及时采取灭杀措施，使蟑螂密度等指标符合国家控制标准。
　　第十一条 单位或个人应当在其管理的食品生产经营场所和宾馆（饭店）、招待所、集贸市场、医院、火车站、汽车站、废品收购站、动物园及公厕、垃圾转运站、垃圾处理场等场所配置相应的“四害”防治设施，并安排专人负责除“四害”工作。
　　第十二条 吉首市卫生行政主管部门应将除“四害”工作纳入食品生产经营单位和各类宾馆、旅社、酒店、饮食店、食堂等公共场所卫生许可管理范畴，对“四害”防治设施不全、“四害”密度超过国家标准的，按照《中华人民共和国食品卫生法》第四十一条规定予以处罚。
　　第十三条 单位和住户应当按照市爱卫会的统一部署，使用统一方法，指定药物及相关器械，采取有效除“四害”措施。
　　第十四条 任何单位和个人不得在吉首地区生产、销售或者使用国家禁止生产、销售、使用的除“四害”药物及器械。
　　第十五条 设立除“四害”服务机构，应当按照国家有关规定，到市爱卫办办理相关手续并备案，同时接受市爱卫办和市卫生防疫主管部门的业务指导。服务机构可与常年不能间断除“四害”工作的特殊行业单位（包括宾馆、旅社、酒店、餐饮店、食品生产经营场所、集贸市场、医院、美容美发场所、休闲娱乐场所、超市、粮食仓库）签订服务合同。
　　第十六条 对在除“四害”工作中取得显著成绩的单位和个人，由市爱卫会予以通报表彰或奖励。
　　第十七条 单位和个人都应当参加除“四害”活动，消除病媒生物孳生场所，使病媒生物密度控制在国家、省规定标准之内。对违反本规定，拒不参加除“四害”等病媒生物活动的，由市卫生行政主管部门、市爱卫办责令限期改正；逾期不改的，依照《湖南省爱国卫生条例》第二十二条规定予以处罚。
　　第十八条 对生产、销售或者使用国家禁止的除“四害”药物及器械的，由相关行政主管部门依法予以处理。
　　第十九条 对违反市容环境卫生管理或食品卫生管理行为的，分别由市市容环境卫生管理部门或市卫生行政主管部门依法予以处理。
　　第二十条 当事人对有关行政机关作出的具体行政行为不服的，可依法申请行政复议或提起行政诉讼。
　　第二十一条 市爱卫办和其他相关部门工作人员在除“四害”工作中滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊的，由所在单位或其上级主管部门给予批评教育或行政处分；构成犯罪的，移交司法机关依法追究刑事责任。
　　第二十二条 本规定由吉首市爱卫办负责解释。
　　第二十三条 本规定自2005年8月1日起施行。2004年4月15日吉首市人民政府办公室印发的《吉首市除“四害”管理暂行规定》同时废止。
　





The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.